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COMMENT
THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT OF FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 804(b)(3) AND UNITED STATES V.
MACDONALD: HOW THINGS SHOULD NOT WORK
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), enacted in 1975,1 details one
of several exceptions to the general rule against admission of hearsay
evidence.' At common law, there was an exception to the hearsay rule
making statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest admissible
if the declarant were unavailable.' The exception reflected the assump-
tion that persons do not make statements damaging to their interests
unless they believe them to be true.' Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3), relying in part on this logic,5 expands the exception to in-
clude statements against penal interest." Because several influential leg-
islators and other experts feared that some hearsay declarants' state-
ments might be false despite their self-incriminating nature, 7 the Rule
as finally enacted requires that "[a] statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
' The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted on January 2, 1975, and became effective on
July 1, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at 28 U.S.C. Rules 101-1103 (1976)).
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) provides:
Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or propriety interest, or so far tended to
subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against
another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless cor-
roborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." Rule 802 provides that hearsay "is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act
of Congress." The basic exceptions to the rule against admission of hearsay are provided in Rules
803 and 804.
a See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1476 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974); C. MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 277 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
4 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note.
*Id.
* See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
See infra note 211.
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trustworthiness of the statement."' A federal trial judge may keep from
the jury exculpatory statements against interest if he believes they are
not sufficiently corroborated under Rule 804(b)(3).9 Thus, the trial
judge's interpretation and application of the Rule's corroboration re-
quirement may be critical to the outcome of a criminal case.
This Comment focuses on United States v. MacDonald,0 a recent
and controversial case"l in which the trial judge refused to admit possi-
bly critical exculpatory evidence under Rule 804(b)(3). MacDonald is
an illustration of the difficulty federal courts have experienced in ap-
plying the 804(b)(3) corroboration requirement in a manner consistent
with legislative purpose, sound evidentiary policy, and constitutional
constraints.
In MacDonald, the defendant's defense depended heavily upon the
admission of one witness's hearsay statements which implicated her in
the crime and exculpated the defendant. 2 The district court judge, de-
spite the voir dire testimony of seven witnesses to the declarant's state-
ments,"3 refused to admit the statements because he believed the declar-
ant, a habitual drug user, to be unreliable, holding that the
corroboration requirement of Rule 804(b)(3) was not satisfied. 4 Per-
haps because he was denied the opportunity to present critical evidence
on his behalf, MacDonald was convicted of the murders of his wife and
two children. 5 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, 8 and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari."1
Part I of this Comment contains a brief sketch of the bizarre facts
of the MacDonald case and a review of the court's treatment of the
804(b)(3) corroboration issue. Part II shows how the corroboration re-
, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
' See United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840
(1978). See generally Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application,
and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851, 971-72
(1981). An exculpatory statement against interest is a statement against the declarant's penal in-
terest which indicates that the defendant is not responsible for the crime charged. The rule also
has been interpreted to permit the trial judge to exclude statements against the declarant's interest
which inculpate the accused if they are not sufficiently corroborated. See infra note 116.
"o 485 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.C. 1979), rev'd on speedy trial grounds, 632 F.2d 258 (4th
Cir.), reh g denied by an equally divided court, 635 F.2d 1115 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), rev'd
and remanded, 456 U.S. 1 (1982), afl'd, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
726 (1983).
" See generally J. McGINNIS, FATAL VISION (1983). The case was discussed on the CBS
news show, 60 Minutes, on Sept. 18, 1983.
" As discussed infra text accompanying notes 40-43, the declarant, Helena Stoeckley, admit-
ted to having been involved in the ritualistic murders of MacDonald's pregnant wife and two
children.
" See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
" MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. at 1091-93. See infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
15 MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.C. 1979).
's MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1982).
17 MacDonald, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983).
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quirement has been interpreted and applied by the federal courts. It is
demonstrated that the courts are in conflict regarding the proper type
and quantum of corroboration required by the Rule as a precondition
to admission of statements against interest, and that a definitive Su-
preme Court interpretation of the requirement is needed. Part III as-
serts that the Supreme Court should adopt an interpretation of the cor-
roboration requirement suggested by one set of cases because it is best
supported by the legislative history, by sound evidentiary principles,
and by constitutional considerations. Part IV argues that the critical
hearsay statements in MacDonald should have been admitted, and that
the Fourth Circuit's refusal to reverse the trial judge's evidentiary deci-
sion, followed by the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari, leaves
unresolved an important evidentiary issue with constitutional
implications.
I. EXCLUSION OF STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST
IN United States v. MacDonald
A. Background of MacDonald
The MacDonald saga began in the early morning hours of Febru-
ary 17, 1970, when military police were summoned to the apartment of
Dr. Jeffrey R. MacDonald, a twenty-six-year-old Army captain serv-
ing as a medical officer at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Upon arrival,
the police found that Dr. MacDonald's pregnant wife and two children
had been brutally murdered, each with numerous stab wounds. Dr.
MacDonald himself was found lying unconscious with seventeen stab
wounds, including a stab wound to the chest which caused a partial
lung collapse."8
When revived, Dr. MacDonald told military police and later a
civilian jury that his family had been attacked by four drug-crazed in-
truders-three men and a woman. He identified one of the men as a
black male who wore an Army-type jacket with sergeant's stripes. He
described the woman as a blond female who wore a floppy hat, boots,
and a short skirt. Dr. MacDonald remembered that the woman had
held a candle or flickering light during the attack. 9
18 See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 3-4, 12-14 (1982) (speedy trial decision);
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, at
3-5, MacDonald, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MacDonald Cert. Peti-
tion]; Brief for the United States in Opposition to a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, at 3, MacDonald, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Government Brief Opposing MacDonald Cert. Petition].
11 See Transcript at 1503-05, United States v. MacDonald, No. 75-26-CR-3 (E.D.N.C.
Sept. 4, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Trial Transcript]. See also MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra
1983]
1002 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:999
Based on Dr. MacDonald's description of the Woman allegedly in-
volved in the attack, a local civilian police officer, P.E. Beasley, con-
cluded that this woman might be Helena Stoeckley, a young drop-out
whom Beasley knew as an informant who was heavily involved with
drug users and cultists.20 Beasley knew that Stoeckley wore a blond wig
and floppy hat and associated with a black male who wore an Army
jacket that matched Dr. MacDonald's description. 1 Beasley confronted
Stoeckley the day after the MacDonald murders, and during their brief
meeting Stoeckley allegedly made her first of several admissions of in-
volvement. 2 Beasley, however, was apparently without authority to de-
tain Stoeckley; he therefore requested that his headquarters contact ap-
propriate military authorities to inform them of Stoeckley's possible
involvement.2"
A preliminary investigation by military officials, however, revealed
physical evidence that was inconsistent with MacDonald's account of
the murders. Based upon that evidence the investigators theorized that
MacDonald had killed his family and staged the macabre murder scene
to cover up his crime.2' The Army formally charged MacDonald with
the three murders on May 1, 1970, and thereafter conducted an exten-
sive investigation of the crimes."5 At the conclusion of their investiga-
tion, military authorities recommended that all charges against Mac-
Donald be dropped because "the matters set forth in all charges and
specifications are not true."2 The military investigators also recom-
mended that civilian authorities investigate Helena Stoeckley.2 7 Mac-
Donald, subsequently, was honorably discharged from the Army.2"
At the insistence of the Justice Department, however, the Army's
note 18, at 50a-52a.
20 Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5739-42, 5833-34. See also MacDonald Cert. Petition,
supra note 18, at 3-4; Government Brief Opposing MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 3.
" Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5739-42, 5833-34.
Id. See infra note 40 (Beasley testimony).
" Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5742-839.
2 The best description of the physical evidence that initially led Army investigators to believe
that MacDonald had committed the murders himself appears in United States v. MacDonald, 531
F.2d 196, 200 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 850 (1978). The 1976 Fourth Circuit opinion
overruled the district judge's pretrial order denying MacDonald's motion for dismissal on speedy
trial grounds. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, however, on the ground that a
pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds cannot be appealed until after
the trial is completed, United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978). The long and complex
procedural history of the MacDonald case is discussed in part IV, infra text accompanying notes
274-95. For a more detailed discussion of the physical evidence that arguably implicated MacDon-
ald, including evidence that the Justice Department discovered subsequent to the Army's investiga-
tion, see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
IS MacDonald, 531 F.2d at 200.
28 Id.
" See id.; see also MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 12-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See MacDonald, 531 F.2d at 201.
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Criminal Investigation Division (CID) continued its investigation of
MacDonald's possible involvement, and the Justice Department later
began its own investigation."9 Approximately five years after the crime,
MacDonald was indicted by a federal grand jury for the three
murders.30 After the first of two unsuccessful speedy trial appeals had
gone to the United States Supreme Court,$' MacDonald was tried dur-
ing the summer of 1979 in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina. 2 The prosecution alleged that
MacDonald had murdered his wife and two children and then staged
an elaborate cover-up. Its case was based entirely on physical evidence
discovered at the scene of the crime and during subsequent investiga-
tions that was inconsistent with MacDonald's description of the crime,
and that supported a reconstruction of the crime which implicated
MacDonald."3
Id.
s MacDonald was indicted on January 24, 1975. See id.
s As discussed supra note 24, the Supreme Court, for procedural reasons, reversed the
Fourth Circuit's initial holding that MacDonald was denied a speedy trial, MacDonald, 435 U.S.
850 (1978), rev ; 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976). After MacDonald's trial, the Supreme Court
reversed a second Fourth Circuit holding that MacDonald had been denied a speedy trial, 456
U.S. 1 (1982), rev" 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir.), reh g denied by an equally divided court, 635 F.2d
1115 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
s' United States v. MacDonald, No. 75-26-CR-3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 1979). MacDonald was
tried and convicted by a jury with Judge Franklin T. Dupree, Jr. presiding. The only reported
opinion which discusses the trial is MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.C. 1979), in which
Judge Dupree explains his reasons for denying bail pending appeal. In that opinion, Judge Du-
pree also explains the reasoning behind several critical evidentiary rulings, including his 804(b)(3)
ruling on the Stoeckley admissions, discussed infra text accompanying notes 76-83. 485 F. Supp.
at 1091-93.
" The government relied heavily upon its analysis and presentation of three kinds of physi-
cal evidence which it argued was inconsistent with MacDonald's account of the crime. First,
threads from MacDonald's pajama top which, according to MacDonald's story, was torn in a
struggle in the living room, were found in his wife's and children's bedrooms, and the pajama top
was soaked with the blood of MacDonald and all three victims. MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 228. In
a demonstration to the jury which MacDonald unsuccessfully fought to prevent on the ground that
it was prejudicial, the government showed that if the pajama top, which contained 48 puncture
wounds, was folded a certain way, the pattern of holes resembled the pattern of ice-pick wounds
on Mrs. MacDonald's body. Id. at 228-29. The government argued that MacDonald killed his
wife and then, realizing that her blood had gotten on his pajama top, had placed the top over his
wife's body and riddled it with stabs to imitate a massacre. Id.
Second, the government demonstrated that blood from the victims was found not only on
MacDonald's pajama top, but also on his glasses, supporting the theory that MacDonald commit-
ted the killings. MacDonald, 531 F.2d at 200. Third, torn and bloody pieces of surgical gloves,
apparently of a type kept by Dr. MacDonald, were found near the victims. Id.
As summarized in the MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 50a-52a; see also Trial
Transcript, supra note 19, at 6560-6615, MacDonald claimed that his pajama top got punctured
because it became tangled around his hands during a struggle with the intruders when he used it
to fend off their attempts to stab him with an icepick. MacDonald argued that the pajama top
could be wrinkled, twisted, and folded by investigators in an infinite number of ways, and that one
of those ways was bound to produce a pattern of holes similar to the wounds found on his wife's
body. MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 228. According to MacDonald, after the intruders left, he stum-
bled around his apartment trying unsuccessfully to revive his wife and children with mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation, which explained why fibers from his ripped pajama top were discovered in
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Dr. MacDonald was the only witness to testify about the circum-
stances surrounding the murders. 4 Once again, he gave a relatively de-
tailed account of an attack by four drug-crazed intruders engaged in a
bizarre and ritualistic rampage. Once again, he claimed that one of the
intruders was a white, blond female who wore a floppy hat and a short
skirt. 5 MacDonald located Helena Stoeckley during the trial, and after
she demonstrated her "reluctance to come to court in obedience to a
subpoena the court ordered her taken into custody and brought ... to
testify on behalf of the defendant.""6 Stoeckley was the only witness
permitted to take the stand who could have corroborated MacDonald's
account of the murders.
3 7
On the witness stand, however, Stoeckley claimed she had no rec-
ollection of the critical period between a little after midnight, February
17, 1970, and 4:35 a.m. of that day, when she returned to her apart-
ment from wherever she had been. 8 She denied being involved in the
murders, but, as summarized by the trial judge, "because of her drug-
crazed condition she had a least come to wonder whether or not she
was in fact involved, and she admitted to owning the clothing [which
matched that described by MacDonald] and the fact that she seemed to
go into mourning following the murders." 9
B. Corroboration of Statements Against Interest
Faced with Stoeckley's denial of involvement in the murders and
her assertion that she could not recall her whereabouts or activities dur-
ing the time of the murders, MacDonald sought to introduce the testi-
each room and why his pajama top and glasses had bloodstains from each victim. He also claims
that he draped the torn pajama top over his wife's body when he realized she was dead. Although
MacDonald apparently knew nothing about the surgical gloves, it is conceivable that an intruder
found them in surgeon MacDonald's apartment and put them on while murdering the victims.
Because of the judge's evidentiary rulings, see infra text accompanying notes 76-83, MacDon-
aid was able to offer little corroborating evidence other than evidence of numerous unaccounted-for
fingerprints in the apartment, 531 F.2d 200, and other circumstantial evidence such as the fact
that he personally received seventeen stab wounds and was found lying unconscious, next to his
wife, see sources cited supra note 18. The trial thus came down to an evidentiary clash between
the government's circumstantial case and MacDonald's weakly corroborated story. The jury,
based on the evidence it was permitted to hear, apparently believed the government's reconstruc-
tion of the murders.
" Although, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 37-39, Helena Stoeckley also took
the stand, she claimed she had no recollection of her whereabouts during the time of the murders.
" Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 1503-05, 6560-6615. For MacDonald's explanation of
the government's physical evidence, see supra note 33.
MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. at 1091.
Because of Judge Dupree's 804(b)(3) ruling discussed infra text accompanying notes 76-
83, seven witnesses to Stoeckley's statements indicating her involvement in the murders were not
permitted to take the stand.
" Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5556-57.
" MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. at 1091.
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mony of seven persons, all of whom testified on voir dire that Stoeckley
had made statements to them admitting her involvement in the Mac-
Donald murders.40 Stoeckley's alleged statements to those persons were
at times confused or accompanied with subsequent denials,41 and "some
of them may have been made while she was under the influence of
drugs.4 2  Nevertheless, according to the voir dire testimony of seven
,o The voir dire testimony of the seven witnesses to Stoeckley's statements against interest is
summarized in the MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 5-8. The witnesses testified on
voir dire as follows:
1) Officer Prince Beasley testified that the day after the crime, he questioned Stoeckley about
the MacDonald murders because she matched MacDonald's description of one of the intruders.
Stoeckley told Beasley "[i]n my mind, it seems that I saw this thing happen," adding that she had
been "heavy on mescaline." Beasley also asked Stoeckley about funeral wreaths which were found
hanging in her yard. Stoeckley, who was wearing black, responded that she was mourning the
MacDonalds. See Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5742-43.
2) William Posey, one of Stoeckley's neighbors, testified that a few days after the MacDonald
slayings, Stoeckley told him that although she did not kill anyone herself, she held a light while
the crime was in progress. She said she observed a "hobby horse thing," which was broken, in the
apartment. She also told Posey that she believed she had been seen by a policeman on Honeycutt
Street on the morning of the crime. Id. at 5759-60.
3) Jane Zillioux, a woman who befriended Stoecldey when Stoeckley moved to Nashville
shortly after the MacDonald murders, testified that Stoeckley told her that she could not return to
Fayetteville (her former home near MacDonald's) because she had been involved in murders there
of a woman and two small children. She told Zillioux that she had worn her white boots and
blond wig on the night of the crime, and that despite her fondness for the wig and boots she found
it necessary to burn them. She also told Zillioux that she was in the company of three males the
night of the crime, and "was with them for the drugs." She described the murder scene to Zil-
lioux, stating "So much blood. I couldn't see or think of anything except blood ... " She asked
Zillioux not to repeat what had been said. Id. at 5693-98.
4) Charles Underhill, another friend of Stoeckley's in Nashville, testified that Stoeckley told
him, while she was in a state of emotional distress, "[t]hey killed her and the two children .
They killed the two children and her." Id. at 5712-13.
5) James Gaddis, a Nashville police officer to whom Stoeckley was providing information
concerning drug traffic, testified that Stoeckley confided to him that she had been at the scene of
the MacDonald murders and knew who was involved. She said that one of the participants drove
a blue Ford Mustang. Id. at 5704-06.
6) Robert A. Brisentine, an Army investigator, testified that he interviewed Stoeckley in
April, 1971. Stoeckley confessed that she had been present during the MacDonald murders but
that she had not actively participated. She also offered to reveal the names of the participants and
the circumstances surrounding the killings if granted immunity from prosecution. Subsequently,
after telling Brisentine that it rained hard right after the murders, Stoeckley said "I have already
said too much," and recanted her statements. Brisentine also recalled that "she knew about the
blood on the bed." Further, at one point during the interview, Stoeckley told Brisentine that "the
hippie element was angry with Captain MacDonald as he would not treat them by prescribing
methadone for their addiction to drugs. Id. at 5717-23.
7) Wendy Rowder, one of MacDonald's trial counsel, testified that she visited Stoeckley in
the wake of a report that Stoeckley had been assaulted shortly after she had testified. Id. at 5929.
Rowder testified that during the course of their conversation, Stoeckley acknowledged that she had
"a memory" of "standing at the couch [in the MacDonald home] holding a candle. ... Asked
whether she had ever lost her sense of guilt concerning the murders, she replied, "No, what do
you think I have taken all these damn drugs for?" Asked why she would not state her recollections
in court, Stoeckley replied, "I can't with those damn prosecutors sitting there." Id. at 5934, 5937.
"I This was arguably true of her statements to William Posey, see id. at 5759, and to Brisen-
tine, see id. at 5718, 5724-25. But see id. at 5745 (confirms statement to Beasley).
42 See id. at 5707 (statement to Brisentine); id. at 5724 (statement to Gaddis). Gaddis also
testified, however, that "most of the time when she gave me information about the MacDonald
1983] 1005
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different witnesses, Stoeckley repeatedly admitted her involvement in
the crime and at times recounted the fateful events in some detail.
43
Although the critical statements of the seven witnesses were hear-
say, the defense argued that they were admissible as statements against
penal interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). 4" The trial
judge conceded that the Rule's first two requirements for admission'
5
were met: the declarant Stoeckley's alleged statements were against her
penal interest since they implicated her in a serious crime, 46 and, even
though Stoeckley testified at the trial, her lack of memory regarding the
critical events made her "unavailable" under well-established interpre-
tations of the Federal Rules.47 Hence, the admissibility of the critical
testimony regarding Stoeckley's statements, because offered to exculpate
the accused, depended entirely upon whether "corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate[d] the trustworthiness of the statement[s]."14
MacDonald, out of the jury's hearing, sought to demonstrate that
Stoeckley's admissions were corroborated by substantial physical and
testimonial evidence, and that the contents of Stoeckley's statements
were remarkably consistent with MacDonald's account of the murders.
First, although both Stoeckley and MacDonald testified without contra-
diction by the government that they had never seen each other prior to
the murders,4 9 Dr. MacDonald's description of the female assailant
matched Stoeckley sufficiently to alert a local policeman to the likeli-
hood of her involvement.50 Stoeckley subsequently admitted to a Nash-
ville neighbor that she had worn her blond wig, floppy hat, and boots
on the night of the murders as alleged by MacDonald.5"
murders, she was not [under the influence of drugs]." Id. at 5707. Gaddis also described Stoeckley
as "the best informant I ever had," id. at 6073, and Beasley described her as "the most reliable
informant I ever had," id. at 5740.
'3 See supra note 40.
" See MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. at 1092.
" Courts interpreting Rule 804(b)(3) have generally agreed that the proponent of a state-
ment offered to exculpate the accused must establish three elements:
(1) that the declarant was unavailable; (2) that the statement "at the time of its
making . . . so far tended to subject [the declarant] to . . . criminal liability...
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true"; and (3) that "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement."
United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
'0 MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. at 1092, aftd, 688 F.2d at 233 (Stoeckley's statements, "if true,
clearly would be against her penal interest").
47 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3) ("unavailability" includes a situation in which the
declarant testifies to lack of memory of the subject matter of the statement).
48 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
4" See MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 8.
£0 See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
"1 See supra note 40 (Zillioux testimony); see also Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5589-
90 (Stoecldey admitted owning blond wig and boots).
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Second, a woman matching Stoeckley's description was seen near
the scene of the murders shortly after the crime was committed,52 and
Stoeckley admitted to her neighbor that she believed she had been seen
after the murders on the same street named by the eyewitness.5" The
same neighbor, William Posey, saw Stoeckley return to her apartment
accompanied by at least two men at 4:30 a.m., shortly after the
murders, in a blue Mustang. " Stoeckley later confided to a police of-
ficer that one of the participants in the murders drove a blue
Mustang."
Third, several of Stoeckley's statements indicated an intimate
knowledge of the murder scene. She remembered having seen a "hobby
horse thing' 56 and blood on the bed, both found at the scene.5" Con-
sistent with MacDonald's account, she stated that she had held a candle
during the murders, 59 and wax drippings found in MacDonald's home
did not match the wax from any of the candles in the house.60
Fourth, Stoeckley provided a possible motive for the killings that
was consistent with MacDonald's contention that the crime was com-
mitted by drug-crazed cultists. Stoeckley was deeply involved with the
local drug culture6 ' and with a cult group that engaged in the ritual
sacrifice of animals,62 and she stated to a CID investigator that the
"hippie element was angry with Dr. MacDonald as he would not treat
them by prescribing methadone for their addiction to drugs."6"
Fifth, Stoeckley admitted to and was seen taking actions subse-
quent to the crimes which were consistent with her involvement. De-
spite her professed fondness for her floppy hat and wig, she told a
See Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 1450-52 (testimony of Sergeant Mica, a military
policeman who answered MacDonald's call for help immediately after the murders).
"3 See supra note 40 (Posey testimony).
I" Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5990-93 (Posey testimony).
'" See supra note 40 (Gaddis testimony).
" See supra note 40 (Posey testimony).
'" See supra note 40 (Brisentne testimony).
57Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 1934-35; MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at
9.
9, See supra note 40 (Posey testimony, Rowder testimony).
60 Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 3834-45. The government argued that Stoeckley's de-
tailed descriptions of the murder scene offered "little, if any, circumstantial support for a finding
of trustworthiness," and attempted to provide alternative explanations for Stoecldey's knowledge of
the scene and the physical evidence implicating her involvement. See Government Brief Opposing
MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 14 n.10.
'* See Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5520-31, 5827-30. MacDonald testified that the
female intruder who participated in the murders said "acid is groovy" and "kill the pigs" while
the murders were being committed, MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 9, 50a. Language
of this kind was part of Stoeckley's idiom in 1970, see Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5342,
5535-36, 5665.
62 Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5542-47, 5763-64.
See supra note 40 (Brisentine testimony).
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friend that she had burned them.64 On the day of the funeral for the
MacDonalds, she was seen wearing a black dress and veil and placing
wreaths outside her house, 5 and she testified that "black is [u]sually
[worn] for doing harm to someone." 6 In addition, she left the city
where the murders were committed, and told a friend in Nashville that
she could not return to MacDonald's city because she had been in-
volved in murders there.
6 7
Sixth, Stoeckley had no alibi for her whereabouts during the time
the crime was committed, 8 and the government could point to no rea-
son why Stoeckley would lie about her involvement in the murders.69
Seventh, four out of Stoeckley's seven independent admissions of
involvement were unsolicited statements to close friends or associates;
7 0
two of the seven statements were made within a few days of the
crime;7 1 and four others were made within fourteen months of the
crime.7 12 Courts have indicated that spontaneous admissions to associ-
ates shortly after commission of a crime are the most inherently
trustworthy.
7 3
In sum, the proffered corroboration demonstrated that Stoeckley
matched Dr. MacDonald's description of the female intruder, was in
the vicinity of the murders, possessed knowledge of the murder scene,
after the murders acted as if she had been involved, was closely in-
volved with a group which possibly had a motive for the murders, and
had neither an alibi nor a reason to fabricate her statements.7 4 Physical
and testimonial evidence suggested that her declaiations against interest
were true, and her reconstructed account of her involvement was con-
sistent with Dr. MacDonald's account. 3
See supra note 40 (Zillioux testimony).
' She was seen by her neighbor, William Posey, see Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at
5995-96 (Posey testimony); MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 10 n.9.
Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5545 (Stoeckley testimony); MacDonald Cert. Petition,
supra note 18, at 10 n.9.
67 See supra note 40 (Zillioux testimony).
" See supra text accompanying note 38.
'9 The government merely argued that Stoeckley's addiction to drugs made her inherently
untrustworthy, as demonstrated by the vague and contradictory nature of some of her statements.
See Government Brief Opposing MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 12-13.
70 See supra note 40 (statements to Posey, Zillioux, Underhill, and Gaddis).
71 See supra note 40 (statements to Beasley and Posey).
7' See supra note 40 (statements to Zillioux, Underhill, Gaddis, and Brisentine).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 133 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981); United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 325 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977); Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1975),
aitd without opinion, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
74 See supra text accompanying notes 49-73.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19, 50-63.
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C. Exclusion of Stoecldey's Statements Against Interest
Nevertheless, after hearing the voir dire testimony concerning
Stoeckley's out-of-court statements against interest, and after consider-
ing the evidence of corroborating circumstances proffered by the de-
fense, the trial judge excluded all of the testimony regarding Stoeckley's
declarations because he believed the corroboration requirement of Rule
804(b)(3) had not been satisfied.76 His primary reason for excluding
the testimony of all seven hearsay witnesses was that Stoeckley, a habit-
ual drug user, was a "pathetic figure" whose statements were inher-
ently untrustworthy.7 The judge explained that because Stoeckley was
purportedly under the influence of powerful narcotics during some of
her confessions, and because she testified under oath that she could not
recall her whereabouts during the time the murders were committed,
nothing she said regarding her activities during the critical time could
be trusted.7 ' He also noted that at the time she made one of her state-
ments against interest she was "'hysterical,' 'crying,' and 'blubber-
ing,' "7 and that her statements were at times equivocal and accompa-
nied by subsequent denials and recantations, including her denial at the
trial of involvement in the murders.80 In addition, he questioned the
credibility of one of the witnesses.8 ' The judge, however, made no at-
tempt to distinguish between those statements that were equivocal and
those that were not, 2 nor did he distinguish between those possibly
made under the influence of narcotics and those made while sober.8"
Unable to present the proffered testimony regarding Stoeckley's
admissions of involvement, MacDonald could not support his account
71 Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 5806-09, 5813-15. Judge Dupree explained the rea-
sons for his 804(b)(3) ruling in MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. at 1092-93.
77 485 F. Supp. at 1091-93.
78 Id. at 1091-92. It is arguable that the trial judge's opinion of Stoeckley's character was
only a factor in his decision to exclude the testimony of the seven witnesses, but was not the
primary reason for that decision. The opinion is not dear, but the Fourth Circuit was of the view
that Stoeckley's character had been the only factor in the lower court's decision:
The District Court . . . concluded the declarations were untrustworthy because
Stoeckley's pattern of remarks in admitting and denying complicity rendered her
hopelessly unreliable, and because her pervasive involvement with narcotic drugs,
and her admissions that she was under the virtually continual influence of the drugs
when these statements were made further manifested unreliability.
MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 233.
79 485 F. Supp. at 1091.
90 Id. at 1091-92.
" Id. at 1092.
In fact, only the statements to William Posey and to Officer Brisentine were accompanied
by subsequent denials, and the other statements were relatively unequivocal. See supra note 49.
" In fact, it appears that Stoeckley was under the influence or narcotics only during parts of
her conversations with Officers Gaddis and Brisentine. See supra note 42.
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of the murders. The jury after deliberating for over six hours, 4 evi-
dently accepted the prosecution's theory, based on circumstantial physi-
cal evidence, that MacDonald had inflicted his own wounds and staged
evidence of an attack by intruders as a cover for murders he had com-
mitted himself. MacDonald was convicted and sentenced to three con-
secutive terms of life imprisonment.8 5
Dr. MacDonald appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. He raised the exclusion of the testimony regard-
ing Stoeckley's statements, which he challenged as inconsistent with the
requirements of Rule 804(b)(3) and the due process clause, as one
ground for reversal."" The court, however, emphasizing that the trial
judge's 804(b)(3) rulings should be upheld unless they constituted an
abuse of discretion, refused to reverse MacDonald's conviction.8 7 Al-
though the court recognized that MacDonald could point to several cir-
cumstances corroborating Stoeckley's admissions," it held that
Stoeckley's "pathetic" appearance, her vacillation, and her "apparent
longstanding drug habits" made her an "inherently unreliable witness"
whose statements did not meet Rule 804(b)(3)'s corroboration
requirement.89
In a concurring opinion, Judge Murnaghan expressed "strong un-
easiness" and "substantial misgiving" with the court's disposition of the
case.90 He cited the legislative history of Rule 804(b)(3) and argued
that the corroboration requirement was designed to meet the "special
dangers of a trumped-up confession by a professional criminal or some-
one with a strong motive to lie."9" He concluded that fabrication was
unlikely in the MacDonald case, 2 pointing to the substantial corrobo-
ration offered by MacDonald and arguing that Stoeckley's habits, char-
acter, and life-style supported, rather than undermined, MacDonald's
MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. at 1097.
8 Id. at 1088.
* See MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 230. MacDonald also alleged that the long delays accompa-
nying his prosecution and trial violated the due process clause, id. at 226, that the trial court erred
by refusing to admit favorable psychiatric character testimony, id. at 227, that the trial court erred
in permitting the "pajama top demonstration" described supra note 33, 688 F.2d at 228, that the
court erred by refusing to admit an Army report which exonerated MacDonald, id. at 229, and
that the evidence, even taken most favorably for the prosecution, did not justify a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 234. MacDonald was unsuccessful in all of his challenges to the
conviction. Id.
$7 Id. at 233.
" Id.
99 Id. The court did not believe that any of the corroborating circumstances made Stoeckley's
alleged statements reliable.
00 Id. at 234-36 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
I1 d. at 235 (quoting 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 804(b)(3) [03]
(1981)).
9Id.
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account of the murders." Judge Murnaghan wrote that, in his view,
the testimony regarding Stoeckley's statements should have been admit-
ted, and that "MacDonald would have had a fairer trial" had those
statements been admitted." Despite his uneasiness, however, Judge
Murnaghan was "not prepared to find an abuse of discretion by the
district court" and thus he concurred in the judgment."5
MacDonald filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court,9" the fourth such petition arising from his
case.9" MacDonald's argument for reversal was that the Fourth Circuit
had erred in its ruling on the Stoeckley statements under Rule
804(b)(3) and the due process clause.9 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 99
The remainder of this Comment demonstrates that Rule
804(b)(3)'s corroboration requirement was misinterpreted by the Mac-
Donald court and that the jury should have been permitted to hear
evidence of Stoeckley's exculpatory statements.100 The Supreme Court
should have granted certiorari because a definitive Supreme Court rul-
ing on the meaning of Rule 804(b)(3)'s corroboration requirement is
needed to settle the confusion among the circuits 01 and because review
of MacDonald's conviction by the highest court in the land seems par-
ticularly appropriate.
II. FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RULE 804(b)(3)
CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
Federal courts have struggled considerably with the corroboration
requirement, and have interpreted and applied it in widely divergent
ways. This section will briefly examine the confusion and disagreement
among the circuits with respect 'to four critical issues. The courts' treat-
ment of the following questions will be explored: (1) What kind of
evidence of trustworthiness may be considered-most importantly, may
,3 Id. at 235. Judge Murnaghan argued that the evidence showed an environment around the
military base in which "Manson-like" murders could occur, and that Stoeckley's bizarre lifestyle
and heavy use of drugs made it quite possible that she could "well accept her presence and, to
some extent, her involvement in the MacDonald murders and . . . become so separated from
reality that, on the fatal evening, she was ripe for persuasion to participate." Id. at 235.
9 Id. at 236.
"Id.
United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51
U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1982) (No. 82-565), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983).
07See infra notes 274-95 and accompanying text.
" See MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 9-16.
" See supra note 96.
100 See infra text accompanying notes 257-73.
"I See infra text accompanying notes 103-71.
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the court examine the trustworthiness of the declarant as opposed to the
trustworthiness of his statement?; (2) What quantum of corroborative
evidence is necessary as a prerequisite to admission under the rule?; (3)
Should the constitutional decision in Chambers v. Mississippi02 guide
804(b)(3) corroboration determinations, and if so, how?; and (4) How
much deference should be given to the trial judge's ruling on whether
the rule's corroboration requirement has been satisfied?
A. What Kind of Evidence Establishing Reliability May Be
Considered Under Rule 804(b)(3)?
While it is generally agreed that almost any kind of circumstantial
evidence that is probative of the truth of a declarant's statement against
interest should be considered under Rule 804(b)(3), there is disagree-
ment among the circuits on whether the judge can base a decision re-
garding admission of a statement in whole or in part on evidence con-
cerning the declarant's personal character.1"' As discussed above,'" the
trial court in United States v. MacDonald "5 excluded the Stoeckley
statements, in spite of substantial evidence of their trustworthiness, pri-
marily because it believed that Stoeckley personally was unreliable. No
other case has been found in which exclusion of an exculpatory state-
ment depended so much on the court's judgment of the personal charac-
ter of the declarant, but several cases indicate that consideration of the
declarant's character is permissible under Rule 804(b)(3).'0 6 In each of
the cases in which a court excluded a statement partially because of its
distrust of the declarant, however, there was also a noticeable lack of
evidence corroborating the truth of the proffered statement.
10 7
In United States v. Poland 108, the court found that the declarant's
exculpatory statement was not made spontaneously to a friend or asso-
date, constituted the declarant's third version of the crime, contained
details that easily could have been learned through the news media, and
generally lacked corroboration. Hence, evidence of the declarant's poor
10- 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
108 See infra text accompanying notes 106-25.
10 See supra text accompanying notes 76-83, 88-89.
100 485 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.C. 1979), alfd, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 726 (1983).
10 At least three such cases involved exclusion of exculpatory statements, see United States v.
Poland, 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981); United States v. Satterfield,
572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d
743 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977), and at least two others have involved
exclusion of inculpatory statements, see United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
107 See infra text accompanying notes 108-19.
1 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981).
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character (drug addiction, .long criminal record, and psychiatric
problems) only added to the other evidence of untrustworthiness."'
Similarly, in United States v. Guillette,"0 evidence that the declarant
was intoxicated when he made his exculpatory statement was said to
cast "additional doubt on the reliability of his declaration" when com-
bined with the fact that his "account . . .lack[ed] any significant cor-
roborating evidence." '' And while United States v. Satterfield" 2 con-
tains the cryptic statement "the Rule refers to the trustworthiness of the
statement, not of the declarant, and that formulation may be broad
enough to put the trustworthiness of the witness as well as the declar-
ant at issue,"'"" the court also asserted that the "only issue involve[d]
[was] the truth of the matters which [the declarant] asserted in those
statements.""' 4 After examining all of the circumstances surrounding
the statement, the court ruled that exclusion was proper ."5
In two cases involving exclusions of inculpatory statements in
which the court indicated it was applying the same 804(b)(3) corrobo-
ration standard it would apply to exculpatory statements,"' the court
implied that the character of the declarant could be considered. But in
both United States v. Alvarez " 7 and United States v. Palumbo,"' the
declarant's statement was neither clearly against his interest nor cor-
roborated by more than a scintilla of evidence indicating the truth." 9
In contrast to those cases in which the declarant's character was
deemed a legitimate source of inquiry under the 804(b)(3) corrobora-
tion requirement, several cases either explicitly or implicitly have held
that the declarant's personal trustworthiness may not be examined in
determining the reliability of his exculpatory statements. Most notably,
the Fourth Circuit, ironically speaking through the judge who con-
curred in MacDonald, stated unequivocally in United States v. Brai-
109 Id. at 895.
110 547 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977).
1 Id. at 754.
112 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
113 Id. at 692 (emphasis added). As discussed infra text accompanying notes 229-32, how-
ever, the Satterfield court indicated that the credibility of the witness, and by implication the
declarant, should not be considered by the trial judge if the person whose credibility is questioned
can be put on the witness stand and cross-examined.
114 Id. at 693.
115 Id.
s For a discussion of the split in the circuits over whether it is appropriate to apply the
same corroboration standard to inculpatory and exculpatory statements against interest, see Com-
ment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Interest, 66 CAUF.
L. REV. 1189 (1978); Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation
Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159 (1983).
227 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
1' 639 F.2d 123 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981).
119 See Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701.02 ("virtual dearth of circumstances corroborating the hear-
say accusation"); Palumbo 639 F.2d at 127-28, 133 (Adams, J., concurring).
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nard."12 "The rule requires not a determination that the declarant is
credible, but a finding that the circumstances clearly indicate that the
statement was not fabricated. It is the statement rather than the declar-
ant which must be trustworthy. '121 The Brainard court overruled the
trial judge's exclusion of an exculpatory admission, focusing not on the
credibility of the declarant but rather on the veracity of his state-
ment.122 Similarly, in United States v. Atkins,1 23 the Third Circuit re-
versed the trial court's exclusion of an exculpatory admission because
the trial judge had concentrated on the young age of the declarant in-
stead of on the evidence corroborating the truth of her statement. 2 4 . In
several other cases inculpatory evidence was admitted despite the un-
trustworthy character of the declarants, indicating that those courts did
not deem the declarant's character relevant.
1 25
In sum, while no other case has gone as far as MacDonald in
relying on the character of the declarant as probative of the truth of a
hearsay statement, there is confusion over whether inquiry into the de-
clarant's character or mental state is permissible at all under Rule
804(b)(3)'s corroboration standard.
A related issue over which the circuits also disagree is whether a
trial judge, in making a Rule 804(b)(3) corroboration determination,
should consider evidence that the declarant denied making a statement
or made subsequent inconsistent statements. In United States v. Po-
land, 12 the court held that the trial judge properly excluded an excul-
patory statement in part because the declarant made subsequent incon-
sistent statements. In Atkins, however, the court overruled the exclusion
of an exculpatory statement despite the fact that the declarant vigor-
ously denied having made it when questioned by the police and agreed
to take a lie detector test. 27 And in United States v. Garris,128 the court
upheld the admission of an inculpatory statement even though the de-
clarant, like Stoeckley, took the stand and testified that she could not
120 690 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1982).
1 Id. at 1124 (emphasis added).
' Id.
129 558 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978).
124 Id. at 136.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1980) (statement of
co-conspirator who admitted involvement in drug deal, but subsequently pleaded innocent, admit-
ted); United States v. Goins, 593 F.2d 88, 90-91 (8th Cir.) (statement of declarant who confessed
to lying before a grand jury admitted with almost no corroborating circumstances), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 827 (1979); Depew v. Hanover Insurance Co., 438 F. Supp. 358, 359 (E.D. Tenn.
1977) (statement of confessed arsonist admitted despite possibility that it was made in order to
recover reward from insurance company).
226 659 F.2d 884, 895 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1059 (1981).
127 558 F.2d at 135-36.
in 616 F.2d 626, 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1980).
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recall having made the alleged admission.
In addition, the circuits are split over whether the judge may re-
fuse to admit testimony about the declarant's statement on the ground
that the witness to the statement, as opposed to the declarant, is person-
ally unreliable. In United States v. Satterfield,129 the Ninth Circuit ex-
plicitly recognized that the circuits are split on this issue.13 0 Although
the court found it unnecessary to dispose of the 804(b)(3) problem
before it, the court intimated that the trial judge should not consider the
credibility of the witness in deciding if the declarant's alleged statement
is trustworthy because "the jury can evaluate the perception, memory,
narration, and sincerity of the witness who testifies about the hearsay
declaration" and weigh it accordingly.""1 Because the hearsay witness
takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination like any other wit-
ness, the judge would be usurping the jury's function by excluding the
evidence based on his assessment of the witness's credibility. 3 2 This
view was shared by the court in Atkins, which overruled the trial
judge's 804(b)(3) exclusion partially because the trial judge had im-
properly considered the credibility of the witness.1 33 But in both United
States v. Bagley"' and United States v. Alvarez,3 5 the Fifth Circuit
held that inquiry into the credibility of the witness was legitimate
under 804(b)(3), and that the trial judge could exclude testimony about
an admission if he believed the witness was lying about either the mak-
ing 3 " or the contents13 7 of the alleged declaration against interest.
B. What Quantum of Corroborating Evidence is Necessary As a
Prerequisite to Admission of Exculpatory Statements Under Rule
804(b)(3)?
Although it is difficult to compare the quantum of corroborative
evidence required by different courts as a prerequisite to admission
under the Rule, because such determinations are fact specific, a fair
evaluation of the cases reveals three quite different approaches to the
"quantum" issue with regard to exculpatory statements.13 ' Presumably,
129 572 F.2d 687, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
130 Id. at 691.
' Id. at 691-92; see also United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1974) ("To
reason that the credibility of these witnesses is such that their testimony would not be believed
attempts to substitute judicial discretion in an area where factfinding prerogatives control.").
13 See infra note 204.
"33 558 F.2d at 135-36; see also Tague, supra note 9, at 902-03.
134 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
1" 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
136 Bagley, 537 F.2d at 167.
137 Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701-02.
I" As discussed infra, courts alternatively have taken a lenient approach, see infra text ac-
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before a court embarks on its evaluation of the evidence corroborating
the truth of a statement, it has already determined that the declaration
made was against the penal interest of the declarant."'9 The question
then becomes, how much (more) evidence corroborating the truth of the
proffered statement is necessary before the trustworthiness of the state-
ment is "clearly indicate[d]"?
Perhaps the most detailed consideration of this issue was under-
taken in United States v. Barrett,'40 but the Barrett approach has since
been identified by one commentator as representative of a class of cases
applying a lenient standard.14 1 In Barrett, the court characterized the
corroboration requirement as "not an insignificant hurdle" that "goes
beyond minimal corroboration" and requires circumstances "solidly in-
dicating trustworthiness." 2 The Barrett court, however, also stated
that it did not read the corroboration requirement "as imposing a stan-
dard so strict as to be utterly unrealistic," and also implied that cor-
roborating evidence falling far short of that required by Chambers
would satisfy the Rule.
1 4 3
United States v. Brainard,1 4  which cited the Barrett standard, 5
illustrates that some courts deem the corroboration requirement satis-
fied by fairly scant evidence of trustworthiness. In Brainard, the excul-
patory statement of an alleged co-conspirator whose personal credibility
was highly questionable14 1 was admitted based on two corroborating
circumstances:147 the record revealed "no apparent reason for [the de-
clarant] to lie," and exculpatory statements were made by the declarant
"on a number of occasions." The court reversed the trial judge's exclu-
sion of the statements and noted that had they been admitted as re-
quired by the Rule, the government could have argued to the jury that
companying notes 140-49, a tough approach, see infra text accompanying notes 150-55, or a mod-
erate approach, see infra text accompanying notes 156-60, to the issue of what quantum of evi-
dence is required to corroborate an exculpatory statement against interest.
139 See supra note 4; see also United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, 1124 (4th Cir. 1982)
("Our initial inquiry is whether the statements were against [the declarant's] interest" (emphasis
added)). At times, however, the courts have seemed to consider whether the declarant's statement
was really against interest as simply one of the circumstances corroborating its trustworthiness
under the corroboration test of 804(b)(3), see, e.g., United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 325
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977).
140 539 F.2d 244, 250-53 (1st Cir. 1976).
.1 See Comment, supra note 116, at 1206.
12 539 F.2d at 253.
Id.; see infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
144 690 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1982).
45 Id. at 1124.
146 As the Brainard dissent pointed out, the declarant had pleaded guilty to a fraud which
involved "an endless series of lies," and was a "conman" and a "liar," id. at 1133 (Potter, J.,
dissenting).
"4 Id. at 1125.
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they were not credible. 48 The corroborating circumstances, said the
Brainard court, "need not be sufficient to remove all doubt with respect
to the hearsay statement. 149
In stark contrast to Brainard, the court in United States v.
Metz 150 upheld the trial court's exclusion of an exculpatory statement
despite corroborating evidence at least as strong as that offered in Brai-
nard. In Metz, the declarant also had no apparent reason to lie,' 51 but
unlike in Brainard both he and the defendant professed never to have
known or seen each other prior to their arrest."' As in Brainard, the
Metz declarant repeatedly reaffirmed that the defendant was inno-
cent.15 ' In addition, the defendant in Metz corroborated the truth of the
declarant's statement with alibi evidence and a- prior inconsistent state-
ment by another witness.1 ' The Fifth Circuit panel simply stated that
"such proffers of corroboration do not convince us of clear error in the
trial court's refusal to admit the statement under Rule 804(b)(3),"'
and therefore affirmed Metz's conviction.
Finally, in what may be regarded as a more moderate, though still
fairly tough, approach, several courts have been confronted with some
evidence that corroborates the trustworthiness of the declarant's state-
ment and other evidence that undermines its trustworthiness and have
balanced the evidence-ultimately holding that exclusion was proper.156
For example, in United States v. Satterfield,'W the defendant attempted
to corroborate the trustworthiness of an exculpatory statement by show-
ing that it was spontaneously made and that bad feelings between the
declarant and the defendant made it unlikely that the declarant would
exculpate the defendant unless he believed him to be innocent. On the
148 Id. at 1125 n.14.
"I Id. In at least two other cases, the court held that exculpatory statements against interest
were sufficiently corroborated to require admission, although there was little or no discussion of
the apparently lenient corroboration standard applied. See United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133,
135-36 (3d. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978); United States v. Ditizio, 530 F. Supp.
175, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1974)
(decided before enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but applying a very lenient corrobora-
tion standard).
580 608 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980).
The declarant had already pleaded guilty to conspiracy, was serving his sentence, and was
in fact fearful that the information he professed to know, which exculpated the defendant but
inculpated others, would subject him to danger in prison. Hence he refused to testify at the defen-
dant's trial, asserting his fifth amendment privilege, id. at 156. If his prior statement against
interest, which caused him personal danger, had been false, he could simply have taken the stand
and told the truth, denying his prior statement, and ridding himself of his personal predicament.
' Compare id. at 157 with Brainard, 690 F.2d at 1119-20.
" Compare Brainard, 690 F.2d at 1125 with Metz, 608 F.2d at 157.
' 608 F.2d at 157.
1' Id.
This balancing approach was identified in Comment, supra note 116, at 1205-06.
157 572 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
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other hand, the court noted that the declarations were made a "substan-
tial length of time" after the crime, that it was not clear that there
really were bad feelings between the defendant and the declarant, and
that the defendant had been identified by eight witnesses as the rob-
ber.158 Those were all factors which the court believed undercut the
reliability of the declarant's admission. The Satterfield court stated that
under Rule 804(b)(3), "the corroborating circumstances must do more
than tend to indicate the trustworthiness of the statement; they must
clearly indicate it."' 59 On balance the defendant failed this test.
160
C. Relationship Between the Constitutional Requirement to Admit
Sufficiently Corroborated Exculpatory Statements and Rule 804(b)(3)
As Professor Tague has pointed out,' 6' several courts have used the
Supreme Court's constitutional holding in Chambers v. Mississippi 
0 2
as a guide to interpreting the corroboration requirement of Rule
804(b)(3). In Chambers, the court held that an accused has a due pro-
cess right to the admission of exculpatory hearsay provided it is accom-
panied by "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness.""0 3 Chambers
sought the introduction of an exculpatory statement by a declarant
named, coincidentally, McDonald. The court reasoned that McDon-
ald's statement was trustworthy because it was clearly against his inter-
est, was made spontaneously to several close associates, and was accom-
panied by several pieces of corroborative evidence. That evidence
included the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, testimony that
McDonald was seen with a gun shortly after the crime, and proof that
McDonald had once owned the type of gun used to shoot the victim.' 6
Further, McDonald was available at the trial to take the stand to repu-
diate or explain his statements."6 5
Several courts have used the factors pinpointed in Chambers as
indicative of trustworthiness to guide their corroboration inquiry under
1" Id.
159 Id. (emphasis in original).
160 Id. For another example of this moderate approach, see Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F.
Supp. 604, 607-08 (D. Md. 1975) (trial court balanced factors for and against admission of excul-
patory statement against interest and decided not to admit), aff'd without opinion, 532 F.2d 750
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
181 Tague, supra note 9, at 964-67.
"s 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
I d. at 302.
164 Id. at 300. Professor Tague contends, however, that a close look at the record in Cham-
bers reveals that the declarant's statements were not really spontaneous, but were made several
months after the crime. Tague, supra note 9, at 999 n.591. Tague argues that spontaneity should
not be demanded in order to admit statements against interest, especially when the statements are
sworn in an affidavit as in Chambers. Id.
1" Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301.
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Rule 804(b)(3), but there has been disagreement over whether the
804(b)(3) corroboration standard was intended to be identical to the
relatively stringent Chambers standard or whether it can be satisfied
with less substantial corroboration. At least four courts, including
MacDonald,6 which upheld the exclusion of exculpatory declarations
against interest, have compared the corroborating evidence presented
with that presented in Chambers. Each concluded that because the evi-
dence of trustworthiness in the case being decided was less substantial
than the Chambers evidence, the statement should be excluded under
Rule 804(b)(3). 167 In effect, these courts have held that Rule 804(b)(3)
requires the same kind and amount of corroboration evidence as is re-
quired to compel the admission of exculpatory hearsay under the due
process clause.
In contrast, at least two other circuit courts have held that even
though the Chambers decision may be helpful in making the 804(b)(3)
corroboration determination, "the Chambers factors should not be ap-
plied inflexibly or unrealistically and ... Fed.R.Ev. 804(b)(3) may be
more inclusive that the Chambers due process standards." ' 8 In United
States v. Barrett,"69 for example, the court ruled that the trial judge
should have considered whether an exculpatory statement was corrobo-
rated by enough evidence to satisfy Rule 804(b)(3), even thought the
court made it clear that there was no issue "of constitutional dimen-
sion" presented by the 804(b)(3) corroboration issue and that the
Chambers corroboration was "far more compelling than anything
here."170 Clearly, Barrett, as opposed to the cases discussed above,
171
interprets Rule 804(b)(3)'s corroboration requirement as significantly
less demanding that the Chambers requirement.
1- 688 F.2d 224, 232 & n.13 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983).
107 See United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
839 (1977); United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1361-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 949
(1976); United States v. Brandenfels, 522 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033
(1975); see also United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 133 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1980) (Adams, J.,
concurring) (Chambers factors considered during 804(b)(3) scrutiny of inculpatory statement
against interest), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981); Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 608
(D. Md. 1975) (spontaneity of statement, a factor stressed in Chambers, considered under rule's
corroboration test), afId without opinion, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919
(1976).
16 United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 325 n.11 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1080 (1978); see United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976); see also United
States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir. 1977).
1.. 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976).
170 Id.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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D. What Standard of Review Should Appellate Courts Apply to
the Trial Court's 804(b)(3) Corroboration Ruling?
The circuits appear to be in relative agreement with regard to
what standard of review should be applied to trial judges' 804(b)(3)
corroboration rulings. The Rule invests the district court with a "sub-
stantial degree of discretion in making this important finding on trust-
worthiness," 172 and the standard for appellate review is "whether the
trial court abused its discretion"173 under the "clearly erroneous stan-
dard."1 74 There is some disagreement over whether the "clearly errone-
ous" standard should apply if the trial judge has not reached the cor-
roboration issue because he disposed of the 804(b)(3) issue before
making that inquiry, but the majority view seems to be that under
those circumstances the appellate court is not bound by the clearly erro-
neous standard but may adduce the corroborating circumstances on its
own. 7 5 In spite of this outward agreement, however, it is interesting to
note that in the cases in which the district court ruling has been re-
versed, the courts have been reluctant to label the lower court as
"dearly erroneous," but have simply found error and reversed without
comment on the proper standard of review.' 78 It is not clear whether
those courts have overruled the trial judge for being mistaken as a mat-
ter of law, i.e. for misinterpreting 804(b)(3), or because they believed
the judge was clearly erroneous regarding the application of the facts to
the law.1
77
The most comprehensive discussion of the nature of the "clearly
erroneous" standard in an 804(b)(3) case is contained in United States
172 United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976).
173 Id.
17 See United States v. Beltempo, 675 F.2d 472, 480 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135
(1982); United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884, 895 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981);
United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115, (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d
316, 325 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d
743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977); United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162,
166 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
17' United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Alvarez,
584 F.2d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 166-67 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
27, See, e.g., United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, 1125 (4th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1385 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092,
1102 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 819 (1981); United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341-42 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977); United States v. Good-
low, 500 F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1974).
177 It appears that at least in United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, 1125 (4th Cir.
1982), and United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929
(1977), the court determined that the trial judge was mistaken as a matter of law in the interpre-
tation of the rule.
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v. Bagley.178 The Bagley court pointed out that appellate review of the
trustworthiness issue will "necessarily require review of findings of fact
and will also require review of the trial court's application of a legal
standard to those facts."1179 The court went on to analogize review of
804(b)(3) corroboration determinations to review of a trial court's pre-
liminary determination of the voluntariness of a confession or determi-
nations regarding whether there has been a fourth amendment violation
involving consent to search, the validity of a pre-search arrest, or the
existence of exigent circumstances.1 80
It should be evident from the preceding discussion that the only
804(b)(3) corroboration requirement problem that has not split the cir-
cuits and left the law in a state of total confusion is the standard of
review issue. On all other questions of substantive interpretation of the
corroboration standard the courts have been unable to agree on how the
Rule should be interpreted. For that reason alone, the Supreme Court
would have been wise to grant certiorari in the MacDonald case so that
it could lend some certainty to this important evidentiary Rule."' In
part III, an attempt will be made to do the job the Court should have
done by recommending, in light of congressional intent, sound eviden-
tiary policy, precedent, and constitutional concerns, how Rule
804(b)(3)'s corroboration requirement should be interpreted and
applied.
III. PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE 804(b)(3)
CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
A. The Effect of Constitutional and Policy Considerations on the
Interpretation of an Ambiguous Statutory Provision
Most courts and commentators who have reviewed the legislative
history of Rule 804(b)(3)'s corroboration requirement have concluded
that, at best, Congress's intended meaning is unclear with regard to
several critical issues.' 82 While courts must always endeavor to inter-
pret statutes to satisfy legislative intent, 83 when the legislature's intent
178 537 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
179 Id.
1*0 Id.
,ii The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance of granting certiorari in
cases which involve circuit splits, especially when interpretation of a federal statute with wide-
ranging impact is involved. See SUP. CT. R. 17(a); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 522
(1971); see also Schafer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452 (1983).
'9 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
18" See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (the objective "is to ascertain the
congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will"); United States v. American Trucking
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) ("In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is
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is unclear with regard to a particular issue, courts are often forced to
fill in the gaps, guided by general policy considerations.'" This does
not mean, however, that a court may substitute its own policy views,
even on court-related issues such as the rules of evidence, when Con-
gress has enacted a provision that reflects rejection of the court's pre-
ferred policy-even when the provision enacted is of uncertain
meaning.2
8 5
A related, but even more fundamental, principle"' of statutory
construction was best expressed in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corporation:1
8 7
We have repeatedly held that as between two possible inter-
pretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconsti-
tutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt
that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt
the rule is the same.'8 8
That principle should be kept in mind in dealing with ambiguities in
the legislative history.
Not only is Congress's intended meaning regarding Rule 804(b)(3)
unclear and open to several possible interpretations,"" but, as Professor
Tague has ably demonstrated, the corroboration requirement raises se-
rious constitutional problems if interpreted as imposing a stringent bar
to admission of exculpatory declarations. 190 Even though he admits that
Congressional intent regarding the corroboration requirement is quite
unclear,"9 Professor Tague suggests that the corroboration requirement
should be interpreted as imposing a strict "clear and convincing evi-
easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.").
16 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("It is
therefore proper that we consider ... what may be described as policy considerations when we
come to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment
nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance."); Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Our duty is to 'favor an interpretation which
would render the statutory design effective in terms of the policies behind its enactment .... ' "),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980).
285 See Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write Into the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 57 TEX. L. REV. 167, 193-95 (1979); Tague, supra note 9, at 979.
'" The principle cited infra text accompanying note 188 was prefaced by "[tihe cardinal
principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (emphasis added).
187 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
18 Id. at 30 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has also pointed out, however, a court
is only free to adopt an interpretation that will avoid a serious constitutional doubt if that inter-
pretation is not precluded by dear legislative intention; otherwise its duty is to strike the provision
as unconstitutional. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948); Hopkins Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 334-35 (1935).
189 See infra text accompanying note 211.
10 See Tague, supra note 9, at 978-1011.
191 Id.
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dence" standard.19 2 He then goes on to conclude that the statute thus
interpreted is unconstitutional 93 Although the corroboration require-
ment raises serious constitutional problems,19 4 the legislative history
supports a more lenient interpretation which saves it.1 95 Under the
Jones & Laughlin rule196 the courts have a "plain duty" to adopt the
more lenient, constitutional interpretation.
Professor Tague argues convincingly that a stringent corroboration
requirement for admission of exculpatory statements raises at least
three constitutional difficulties.197 First, the Rule, if strictly interpreted,
clashes with defendants' fifth and sixth amendment right to present evi-
dence in their own defense. The rationale underlying the Chambers v.
Mississippi 193 decision and other Supreme Court cases regarding the
confrontation and compulsory process clauses strongly suggests that ex-
clusion of exculpatory evidence supported by reasonable assurances of
reliability abrogates defendants' rights.1 99 Second, an overly stringent
corroboration requirement, because it permits the judge to withhold re-
liable evidence from the jury, strips the jury of its customary factfinding
role in contravention of defendants' sixth amendment right to a trial by
jury.200 Third, if the Rule is interpreted as imposing a corroboration
requirement for admission of exculpatory declarations which is more
stringent than the requirement it imposes for admission of inculpatory
statements, it violates the equal protection clause because it unjustifi-
ably discriminates between the government and the criminal
defendant.20 1
While it is both unnecessary and beyond the scope of this Com-
ment to retrace the constitutional reasoning of Professor Tague and the
few courts that have touched upon the problem, this Comment adopts
the view that a stringent corroboration requirement raises the serious
I" Id. at 979-80.
'" Id. at 959, 965, 980.
194 Id. at 980-1011.
295 See infra text accompanying note 211.
I" See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
17 See Tague, supra note 9, at 989-1011. In fact, Tague believes there are four constitu-
tional difficulties with the rule-the three discussed infra text accompanying notes 197-202, and
problems which arise from what Tague views as congressional failure to justify its stringent cor-
roboration requirement, see Tague, supra note 9, at 980-89. Tague's "justification" argument,
however, is not as strong as his other three constitutional arguments. He does not establish con-
vincingly that Congress was so deficient in its justification of the corroboration requirement that
the serious constitutional problems that he suggests did in fact arise, id., so this Comment will
discuss only the other three constitutional difficulties he identifies.
l 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
'" See Tague, supra note 9, at 1000-1011; see also United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d
335, 341-42 (9th Cir. 1977).
2 0See Tague, supra note 9, at 998-1000.
201 See id. at 989-98.
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constitutional problems outlined above.2 2 Hence, as suggested by Jones
& Laughlin,"" courts should find a way to interpret the corroboration
requirement that is in accord with the legislative intention of requiring
more than minimal corroboration, but that is not so stringent that it
raises serious constitutional difficulties.
B. Proper Interpretation
1. The Declarant's Character Should Be Irrelevant
to an 804(b)(3) Determination
Any interpretation of Rule 804(b)(3) that permits a trial judge to
assess the declarant's character during the corroboration determination
presents constitutional difficulties. Criminal defendants have a right to
be tried by a jury, and questions of credibility are traditionally decided
by juries, pursuant to the judge's instructions regarding the weight to
be placed on certain types of evidence.204 In most contexts, the judge
may not exclude evidence based on his assessment of the credibility of
the witness, especially when the witness is available for cross-examina-
tion.20 5 In many 804(b)(3) cases the declarant is only unavailable for
purposes of the Rule. For example, the declarant may invoke the privi-
lege against self-incrimination or claim loss of memory regarding the
alleged declaration.20" In such circumstances, the declarant can be
placed on the stand and cross-examined to expose character flaws rele-
vant to his credibility. 207 There is no legitimate reason for a judge to
'0' See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
:03 See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
204 See Tague, supra note 9, at 998-99. As Tague also points out, with every exception to the
hearsay rules other than Rule 804(b)(3), the Federal Rules permit the jury to assess the credibility
and weight of hearsay evidence and of the witness who reports it once the evidence is admitted,
and do not permit the judge to exclude evidence because he believes it to be untrustworthy. See
Tague, supra note 9, at 972 & n.629, 980 n.670. In fact, that is the general policy of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Rule 601 states that "fe]very person is competent to be a witness except as
provided in these rules." See, e.g., United States v. Lightly, 677 F.2d 1027 (1982) (error not to
admit testimony of a person who was incompetent to stand trial because he was criminally insane
and suffered hallucinations, citing FED. R. EVID. 601).
'06 See sources cited supra note 204; see Tague, supra note 9, at 902-03.
206 See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 233 & n.14 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983); United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, 1123-24 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Beltempo, 675 F.2d 472, 480 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982);
United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980); United
States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980); United
States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States
v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); see also United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 325 n.8
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
'07 See, e.g., MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 230-31 (declarant took witness stand, asserted lack of
memory); United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 633 (2d Cir.) (declarant appeared before jury
and was cross-examined), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980).
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usurp the jury's traditional function of credibility assessment by exclud-
ing the declarant's admission because the judge believes the declarant to
be untrustworthy. When the declarant is not available for cross-exami-
nation, the government can still introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to
the declarant's Personal character that would enable the jury to assess
the declarant's credibility and the weight to be attached to the declar-
ant's statement.20 8 Hence, even if a contrary reading of legislative intent
is possible,29 the Jones & Laughlin rule2 10 compels interpretation of
Rule 804(b)(3) to preclude consideration of the declarant's character
prior to admission of the declaration.
The legislative history, moreover, is fairly compelling on this issue.
The primary reason for adding any corroboration requirement to the
against-penal-interest exception was that some legislators believed that
even though a statement was against the declarant's interest, the state-
ment would still be untrustworthy because many declarants would be,
perhaps by definition, wrongdoers and so inherently untrustworthy."
208 See FED. R. EVID. 806.
209 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
2 As Professor Tague, Tague, supra note 9, at 866-978, and other commentators have am-
ply demonstrated, the legislative history of Rule 804(b)(3), and especially the history of its corrob-
oration requirement, is confusing and difficult to interpret, see, e.g., 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUEL.
LER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 489 (1980); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
804-90 to 804-114, (1981); Comment, supra note 116; Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest:
Standards of Admissibility Under an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U.L. REV. 148 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as B.U. Note]; Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: What Must Be Corrobo-
rated Under the Newly Enacted Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(3)?, 9 VAL. U.L. REV.
421 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Valparaiso Note]. Beginning in 1965 when the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States formed an Advisory Committee to work with its Standing Committee to
aid the Supreme Court and Congress in drafting new Federal Rules of Evidence, the Rule went
through several drafts. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States
District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft];
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51
F.R.D. 315 (1971); Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Revised Definitive Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
Courts and Magistrates (1971) (unpublished; on file with Judicial Conference of United States);
Supreme Court of the United States, Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates,
56 F.R.D. 183 (1973); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7075 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT]. Various persons, including
Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and later Judge Henry J. Friendly, convinced Congress to
add and then strengthen the corroboration requirement of the rule. See Tague, supra note 9, at
873-92; Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary on Proposed Rules of Evidence, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 264-64
(1973) [hereinafter cited as House Subcommittee Hearings].
The meaning of that requirement is ambigious. It seems dear that throughout the process the
draftsmen were concerned with preventing "fabrication," that they eventually became convinced
that because declarants, especially prisoners, were often personally untrustworthy, independent
evidence corroborating the truth of their statements, even though against interest, is necessary, and
1983]
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Hence the untruthful character of the declarant was presumed, and the
corroboration requirement was added to provide a means of overcoming
this presumption. It was thus expected that in most cases, inquiry into
the character of the declarant would reveal untrustworthiness. 21 2 It
would make no sense for Congress to add a corroboration requirement,
designed to permit admission of trustworthy statements by persons of
unreliable character, if character could be used to provide the basis for
exclusion of such declarations.213
In addition, there is no evidence in the legislative history indicat-
ing that the character of the declarant is at all relevant to the corrobo-
ration determination. The plain words of the Rule-that corroborating
circumstances must "clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the state-
ment"2 1 -indicate that it is the statement rather than the declarant
that must be trustworthy.
1 5
Moreover, because evidence of vacillations or subsequent denials
by a declarant merely relate to personal credibility, such evidence
should not be considered under the 804(b)(3) corroboration standard.
There is nothing in the legislative history that authorizes consideration
of such factors, and constitutional considerations also militate against
consideration of such evidence by the judge.2 16 Anyone subject to crimi-
nal liability, as are all declarants who have made a statement against
penal interest, is entitled by the fifth amendment to refuse to acknowl-
edge having made such a statement, 1 especially if summoned to the
witness stand, as was Stoeckley in United States v. MacDonald.18 In
that the defendant's own testimony would not suffice to corroborate the declarant's admission. See,
e.g., Letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindeinst to Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger (Dec. 22, 1971), reprinted in House Subcommittee Hearings, supra, at 48; Tague, supra
note 9, at 880-92.
It may be argued that a declarant like Stoeckley, more irrational and confused than a calcu-
lating, self-interested criminal, was not contemplated by the draftsmen, who might have wanted
some sort of "character trustworthiness" shown in such a case. But, again, that would go against
the general policy of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see supra note 204, and in any case Stoeckley
was considered a reliable informant by Officer Beasley. See supra note 42.
... See supra note 211. Professor Tague recognizes that Congress made this presumption, but
questions whether it is an accurate one. See Tague, supra note 9, at 982 & n.675.
11' Such a construction would have the effect of making the corroboration requirement super-
fluous in what Congress expected to be the majority of cases in which the declarant was of ques-
tionable character, and there is a presumption against construing a statute as containing superflu-
ous or meaningless words. See United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203, 207 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008 (1969); see also Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58
(1878).
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (emphasis added).
15 The words do not, of course, preclude the other view.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 197-201.
21? See supra note 206. The fifth amendment provides that "no person ... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
218 688 F.2d 224, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1982), afPg 485 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.C. 1979), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983).
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Chambers, the declarant denied having made the exculpatory statement
that the defendant sought to introduce, but the Supreme Court held
admission was required because the original statement was sufficiently
corroborated to ensure trustworthiness, and so exclusion of the state-
ment denied the defendant a trial "in accord with traditional and fun-
damental standards of due process."'2 19 In fact, common sense suggests
that it should not be at all uncommon for a declarant to vacillate about
or retract a personally damaging statement, so such actions should have
no probative value in making 804(b)(3) determinations. The cases that
recognize this are correct.220  -
Finally, a requirement that the defendant prove the good character
of the declarant- in the unusual case in which the declarant has alleg-
edly confessed to having committed a crime against the defendant, while
not only unsupported by the legislative history, would be patently un-
fair. As MacDonald argued in his certiorari petition, "[c]ertainly, one
who is entitled to the presumption of innocence and who contends...
that he was victim rather than perpetrator cannot be charged with the
burden of proving that his assailants are of good and reliable habits and
character .... Victims do not enjoy the option of selecting their assail-
ants." 221 Thus, cases such as United States v. Brainard,22 2 holding that
a trial judge making an 804(b)(3) corroboration determination may not
base a conclusion that a statement against interest is untrustworthy
upon a belief that the declarant is personally unreliable, are correct.
The same basic constitutional considerations regarding the proper
function of the jury in a criminal case discussed above223 counsel
against permitting the trial judge to base the corroboration decision
upon the judge's own assessment of the credibility of the witness to a
declaration. 224 As the court noted in United States v. Satterfield,225 "in-
terpreting Rule 804(b)(3) to authorize the trial judge to pass on the
21 410 U.S. at 284.
"10 See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
"I MacDonald Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 16. "If Dr. MacDonald's account of the
crime is true, it was a virtual certainty that the actual perpetrators would prove to be users of
drugs and persons of disturbed, if not depraved, character." Id. It is a well settled principle of
statutory construction that interpretations that lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd conse-
quence should be avoided, see Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461
(1982); United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-87 (1869); Virgin Islands v. Berry,
604 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1288 (5th Cir.
1978).
222 690 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 120-25.
'2 See supra text accompanying notes 200 & 204-10.
114 In addition, the witness to the declaration against interest will always be available for
cross-examination, whereas the declarant will be available only if, although he is deemed "un-
available" for 804(b)(3) purposes, he is still able to testify, perhaps invoking the fifth amendment
only with regard to certain questions. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
225 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839 (1977).
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credibility of the witness would implicate difficult constitutional ques-
tions. 'Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to
present witnesses in his own defense.' "22 Nothing in the legislative
history gives the trial judge that power;227 once again the Jones &
Laughlin rule2 8 compels that the statute be interpreted to preclude ju-
dicial consideration of the witness's credibility in making a Rule
804(b)(3) corroboration determination, and the cases that so interpret
the rule are correct.
229
2. The Quantum of Corroborative Evidence Necessary to Permit
Admission of Exculpatory Statements Under the Rule.
As discussed above,230 a stringent 804(b)(3) corroboration require-
ment would pose serious constitutional problems because it would im-
permissibly impair the defendant's right to present reliable evidence
and to have that evidence heard and evaluated by a jury. In order to
avoid constitutional difficulties, then, the corroboration requirement
should be interpreted leniently, yet consistently with a "possible inter-
pretation" 231 of congressional intent. Clearly, the quantum of evidence
required by the rule must be less than what was deemed in Cham-
bers 112 to require admittance of the testimony under the due process
clause. To remove constitutional "doubts" the rule should be satisfied
by evidence that is well within what was required by Chambers pro-
vided the legislative history supports such a construction.2 3 Interest-
ingly, the Supreme Court noted in Chambers that the proffered evi-
dence of trustworthiness made the declarant's admissions "well within
the basic rationale of the exception for declarations against interest," 2"
which implies that any statutory corroboration requirement should per-
mit introduction of declarations supported by corroborating evidence
"well short" of what was proffered in Chambers. Hence, the cases dis-
cussed earlier 3 5 which equated the Chambers corroboration test with
the 804(b)(3) test should not be followed.
The legislative history of the corroboration requirement supports
an interpretation that is lenient enough to remove constitutional
26 Id. at 692 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302).
2" See supra text accompanying notes 211; Tague, supra note 9, at 902.
ng See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
2 See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
"0 See supra text accompanying notes 197-202 & 204-10.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 180-88 (the Jones & Laughlin rule).
410 U.S. 284 (1972). See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text, for discussion of the
corroborating evidence in Chambers.
See supra text accompanying note 211.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added); see Tague, supra note 9, at 965-66.
s See supra text accompanying notes 166-67, and cases cited supra notes 166-67.
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doubts.2"' There is no disagreement that a declaration must be "against
interest" under the Rule;23 7 the disputed issue is how much evidence of
trustworthiness is required by the corroboration requirement.23 ' The
House Committee's statement that the',circumstances presented in
United States v. Donnelly 239 "plainly indicated reliability" suggests
that the maximum amount of corroboration required by the rule should
be the equivalent of what was proffered in Donnelly.24 A review of the
Donnelly facts reveals that proof that the declarant had the opportunity
to commit the crime241 and some scant circumstantial evidence identify-
ing the declarant as a suspect2 42 was enough to ensure the trustworthi-
210 Commentators who have explored the legislative history are in sharp disagreement over
the proper standard of corroboration. Professor Tague argues that Congress meant to establish a
"clear and convincing evidence" test. Tague, supra note 9, at 963, 965. Tague, however, later
argues that conditioning admissibility of exculpatory statements on "clear and convincing evi-
dence" corroborating their reliability is unconstitutional. Id. at 978-1011. At least one other com-
mentator has argued that the "clearly indicate" standard is fairly stringent, and he advocates that
before admitting either exculpatory or inculpatory statements the trial judge should "balance those
facts corroborating the declarant's statement with those undermining its reliability." Comment,
supra note 116, at 1206, 1216. That commentator would apparently permit the judge to consider
the character and mental state of the declarant during this balancing process. Id. at 1209-10 &
n.128.
On the other hand, several commentators, led by Judge Weinstein, have argued that the Rule
imposes a much easier corroboration requirement. Judge Weinstein has stated that a court should
ask if there is "sufficient corroboration to 'clearly' permit a reasonable man to believe that the
statement might have been made in good faith and that it could be true." 4 J.WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 211, at 804-104. Louisell and Mueller argue that the 804(b) (3) corroboration
requirement "should be considered satisfied by evidence independent of the statement itself which
tends either directly or circumstantially to establish a matter asserted by the statement." 4 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 211, § 489 at 1159. Another commentator asserts that "any
of the following types of corroborative evidence should satisfy the trustworthiness standard: oppor-
tunity, motive, or acts subsequent to the crime," Valparaiso Note, supra note 211, at 439, and
another asserts that the court should focus on the trustworthiness of the statement, adopt a "flexi-
ble attitude toward admissibility," and not require a quantum of corroborative evidence which is
"so great that valuable and presumably reliable evidence is arbitrarily excluded." B.U. Note,
supra note 211, at 174. This commentator also notes that the crucial inquiry is on the trustworthi-
ness of the statement, id., but at one point calls the 804(b)(3) test "one of the strictest corrobora-
tion requirements," id. at 173.
237 See supra text accompanying notes 45 & 211. That is not to say, however, that it is
always easy to determine if a statement is in fact against interest. See Tague, supra note 9, at 904-
36.
133 See supra note 236.
23, 228 U.S. 243 (1913). The Advisory Committee decided that Donnelly (in which the Su-
preme Court, despite a powerful and eloquent dissent by Justice Holmes, id. at 277-78 (Holmes,
J., dissenting), refused to admit evidence of a declarant's exculpatory statements against his penal
interest) should be overruled. Advisory Committee's Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 211, at
385.
140 See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 211, at 16.
141 Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 272.
141 There was no attempt to prove that the declarant, who died shortly after confessing to the
murders, was personally credible or reliable. Instead, the only proof of the reliability of the declar-
ants confession was evidence that he lived in the vicinity and knew the habits of the victim, that
tracks were found at the murder scene leading in the direction of the declarant's, and the defen-
dant's, home, that whoever made those tracks sat down on his way home (which the declarant,
who suffered from consumption, might have done), and that the declarant and the defendant did
not collude. Id.
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ness of his statement in Donnelly. Thus, the following test regarding
the quantum of evidence required can be derived: as long as the declar-
ant's statement is against penal interest,243 corroborating circumstances
"clearly indicate" the trustworthiness of the statement if evidence is in-
troduced that demonstrates that the chance is greater than 50%244 that
the declarant's statement is true. That can be established in any way
including proof of motive or opportunity,24 and at least some Don-
nelly-type circumstantial evidence, other than the defendant's own testi-
mony, 46 that the declarant was probably connected to the crime.
2 47
The test suggested is more lenient than Tague's "clear and con-
vincing evidence" standard,2 48 but it is just as easily derived from the
legislative history, and unlike the Tague test it will eliminate doubts
regarding the Rule's constitutionality. Although the standard suggested
is more concrete than the standard suggested by United States v. Bar-
rett,2 49 it is probably closest to the standard suggested in that case than
to any other standard heretofore articulated by a court considering
804(b)(3).
3. Standard of Appellate Review
As noted above,"' the only 804(b)(3) corroboration issue upon
which the circuits are in substantial accord is the proper standard of
review of trial court corroboration rulings. Appellate courts have agreed
that the legislative history and appropriate analogies require upholding
trial court 804(b)(3) corroboration rulings unless they are "clearly er-
roneous." '251 As suggested in United States v. Bagley,252 however, the
trial court's corroboration determination has both a factual and a legal
component. An appellate court must defer only to the trial judge's find-
ings of fact. It is free to overrule the trial court's rulings without any
deference if it believes the district judge misinterpreted the law, i.e., if
243 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
244 See Tague, supra note 9, at 900-14.
245 Id. at 917-20.
2" Id. at 921.
2" See supra text accompanying notes 239-42. In other words, if there is evidence, other than
the defendant's own testimony, that corroborates the trustworthiness of the declarant's statement as
convincingly as did the evidence in Donnelly, see supra notes 239-42, then the statement should be
admitted. Because Congress deemed that the evidence in Donnelly met the "clearly indicate"
standard, see supra text accompanying note 244, it must have believed it met the "preponderance
of the evidence plus" standard suggested, since the two accomplish the same thing.
24, Compare Tague, supra note 9, at 959 & n.548 ("clearly indicate" equals 70% proof) with
the test suggested supra text accompanying notes 243-47.
24, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976). See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 172-74.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 172-74 & 178-80.
22 537 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 1075 (1977).
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the 804(b)(3) corroboration ruling reveals a misunderstanding of the
requirements of the Rule.253 This explains and justifies the result in
several cases in which the trial judge's exclusion of a statement was
overruled. 2" In addition, an appellate court should not hesitate to re-
verse if it clearly appears that the trial court erred. The "clearly erro-
neous" standard is not an absolute command to affirm the ruling
below.
255
Finally, if the trial court did not reach the corroboration issue but
the appellate court finds it necessary to consider it, then the "clearly
erroneous" standard should not apply. There is nothing in the legisla-
tive history to suggest that that standard must apply in such circum-
stances. The reasons to accord great discretion to a trial judge-his
ability to observe demeanor, ete.25 -disappear if the trial judge never
considered corroboration evidence.
IV. MacDonald AND RULE 804(b)(3)
As noted in part I, the district judge in United States v. MacDon-
ald 2 57 excluded testimony as to the numerous declarations against in-
terest of Helena Stoeckley primarily because he believed her to be a
"pathetic figure" and wholly unreliable because of her past history of
drug use. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, based on its agreement with the
trial judge's assessment of Stoeckley's character. 258 As demonstrated in
part III, however, evidence that a declarant is of unreliable character
should in no way influence the 804(b)(3) determination of whether cor-
roborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the de-
clarant's statement.25 9 Consideration of the declarant Stoeckley's char-
acter in MacDonald was a particularly egregious error because it
required the alleged victim to demonstrate the reliability of his alleged
assailant. Further, as Judge Murnaghan pointed out in his concur-
rence, 26 even if Stoeckley's character could be considered under the
253 Id. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
I" See, e.g., United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, 1123-25 (4th Cir. 1982) (trial judge
improperly considered declarant's personal character); United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 134-
36 (3d Cir.) (trial judge improperly considered credibility of declarant and witness), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1071 (1978).
"' As discussed infra text accompanying notes 259-73, the trial court in MacDonald was not
only erroneous in its interpretation of the law, but was also "dearly erroneous" in its application
of Rule 804(b)(3)'s corroboration requirement to the facts before it.
'" See United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839
(1977).
' United States v. MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.C. 1979).
25 United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 233 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
726 (1983).
50, See supra text accompanying notes 204-29.
160 MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 235. (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
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Rule, her history of drug abuse and cult activities does not undercut the
reliability of her admission to involvement in a Manson-like murder;
rather, it supports her statement, as well as MacDonald's account of
the crime.
Further, in ruling that Stoeckley's declarations were insufficiently
corroborated under Rule 804(b)(3), the trial judge was influenced by
his belief that one of the witnesses to Stoeckley's statements, Detective
Beasley, was not credible.261 The trial judge was not authorized by
Rule 804(b)(3), as that Rule is properly interpreted, to consider the
credibility of a witness to a statement. A judge who does so may be
trampelling on the defendant's constitutional right to a trial by jury.262
In addition, the trial judge was influenced by the fact that Stoeckley
had vacillated on her admissions and had denied involvement on the
stand.2"' A judge making an 804(b)(3) determination should not be
influenced by subsequent denials by a declarant who has implicated
herself in an earlier statement.2
In addition, the trial judge in MacDonald, affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit, apparently believed that the quantum of proof offered by Mac-
Donald to corroborate Stoeckley's admissions was insufficient to pass
the 804(b)(3) test.265 The test must have been interpreted as imposing
an extremely tough burden on the defendant-an interpretation which
poses serious constitutional difficulties 66 and should be discarded in
favor of the more lenient interpretation suggested above.267 But even
under the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, and probably even
under the constitutional test articulated in Chambers v. Mississippi,268
it is difficult to see how the corroborating evidence proffered by Mac-
Donald would fail. As detailed in part I, MacDonald established
through physical and testimonial evidence that Stoeckley matched the
description of his assailant, was in the vicinity of the MacDonald house
on the night of the murders, possessed intimate knowledge of the mur-
der scene, acted, after the murders, consistently with having been in-
volved, had a possible motive for the murders, and had neither an alibi
nor a reason to fabricate her statements. 69 No 804(b)(3) case has been
discovered in which the defendant offered as much proof as MacDon-
261 See United States v. MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (E.D.N.C. 1979); see supra
text accompanying note 81.
:6 See supra text accompanying notes 223-29.
2' MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. at 1091-92; see supra text accompanying notes 80 & 82.
2' See supra text accompanying notes 214-20.
:65 MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 233, afl'g 485 F. Supp. at 1091-93.
168 See supra text accompanying notes 197-202, 204-10 & 230-35.
'6 See supra text accompanying notes 237-49.
2- 410 U.S. 284, 300-01 (1972).
"0 See supra text accompanying notes 50-75.
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aid did; on the other hand, several courts have admitted exculpatory
statements corroborated with far less evidence."' Most importantly, if
the 804(b)(3) corroboration requirement was interpreted as it should
have been, Stoeckley's admissions should have been admitted.
When the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district judge's 804(b)(3)
corroboration ruling, it said that it could not reverse unless the ruling
constituted an abuse of discretion. 17 As the preceding discussion
reveals, however, the trial judge not only was "clearly erroneous" in his
application of Rule 804(b)(3) to the facts of MacDonald, but also was
incorrect in his legal interpretation of the Rule's corroboration require-
ment. The judge erroneously believed that 804(b)(3) permitted inquiry
into the declarant's character, consideration of subsequent recantations,
and judgment of the credibility of witnesses to the declarant's state-
ments. 17 As discussed in part III, an appellate court owes no deference
to a trial judge's mistaken interpretation of the law, so the Fourth Cir-
cuit should have reversed. Even if the court were not so inclined it
seems the trial judge's application of law to the facts was "clearly erro-
neous." The corroboration offered in MacDonald was so strong that it
could have passed even a strict interpretation of Rule 804(b)(3)'s cor-
roboration requirement; 73 in fact, the proffered assurances of the relia-
bility of Stoeckley's admissions were probably strong enough to meet
even the Chambers test.
In sum, both the district court and the Fourth Circuit in MacDon-
ald were incorrect on almost every aspect of the 804(b)(3) corroboration
issue. The Rule itself was misconstrued in several ways, and even
under an incorrectly tougher interpretation of the corroboration re-
quirement the trial judge was "clearly erroneous" in his application of
the Rule to the substantial evidence proffered by MacDonald.
V. CONCLUSION
The MacDonald murders occurred in 1970. Dr. MacDonald was
investigated and released by military authorities, who recommended
that the woman he alleged to be his assailant be investigated. 74 Never-
"0 See, e.g., United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Atkins, 558 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978); United States v. Barrett,
539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976).
'71 MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 233.
* See supra note 78.
' The corroborative evidence offered in MacDonald would have satisfied, for example, Pro-
fessor Tague's "clear and convincing evidence" standard. See supra note 244 and accompanying
text.
"4 See United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 200 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 850
(1978).
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theless, both the military, and later the Justice Department, continued
to investigate MacDonald's possible involvement in the murders. The
investigation languished in the Department of Justice until late 1974,
when a civilian indictment against MacDonald was finally sought.27 5
After he was indicted, MacDonald's trial was delayed until late 1979
while he waited for the courts to resolve the first of his two speedy trial
motions.276 In 1975, the district court had denied MacDonald's motion
to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. 77 The Fourth Circuit reversed in
1976, holding that the government's delay in bringing MacDonald to
trial had violated his sixth amendment rights.2 78 In 1978, however, the
Supreme Court reversed on the ground that a criminal defendant could
not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds
until after the trial had been completed.27 9 On remand from the Su-
preme Court, a panel of the Fourth Circuit held that the military's
prior disposition of the case did not preclude a civilian trial on double
jeopardy grounds.28 0 At MacDonald's trial, he lost several critical evi-
dentiary motions, most notably the 804(b)(3) motion discussed through-
out this Comment, and thus was unable to introduce the Stoeckley dec-
larations. Based entirely on circumstantial evidence,2 1 some of it of
questionable quality,28 2 MacDonald was convicted. He immediately
appealed to the Fourth Circuit, making his second speedy trial motion.
The appellate court, in an opinion by Judge Murnaghan, held that
MacDonald's -sixth amendment rights had been violated, and reversed
his conviction.2 8 The government petitioned for rehearing en banc, and
in a rare explanation of its decision to deny rehearing, the Fourth Cir-
cuit revealed that it had been sharply split over the merits of MacDon-
ald's speedy trial claim.2 " The Supreme Court once again granted the
government's certiorari petition to consider MacDonald's now ripe
speedy trial claims. The Court, not known recently for its sympathy for
criminal defendants, 28 5 reversed the Fourth Circuit.28 ' Three Justices
s See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 13 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
x See infra text accompanying note 279.
See MacDonald, 531 F.2d at 202 n.7.
278 MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976).
279 United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
280 United States v. MacDonald, 585 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1978).
281 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
282 As discussed supra notes 33 & 86, MacDonald strenuously objected to the "pajama top
demonstration" because of its speculative nature.
282 United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir.), reh K denied by an equally divided
court, 635 F.2d 1115 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 456 U.S. 1 (1982).
I" United States v. MacDonald, 635 F.2d 1115 (4th Cir. 1980).
285 In the 1981 Term, the Court disposed of 15 criminal cases and 15 cases dealing with
habeas corpus in full opinions on the merits. Of those 30 cases, it held for the government 25 times
and against the government only five times. See The Supreme Court 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 62, 310-11 (1982); see also Bernstein & Eisenstein, 1982 Supreme Court Update, Part I,
The Criminal Law, TRIAL, Sept, 1982, at 45.
288 United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982).
THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
sharply dissented, 87 and a fourth indicated that the question presented
was quite "close." '2 8  The majority described MacDonald's alleged
crime as "heinous,' 2 9 and deceptively stated that MacDonald did not
challenge the jury's verdict.
290
MacDonald then went back to the Fourth Circuit on his eviden-
tiary claims, which were denied. Shortly after issuing his concurring
opinion in MacDonald, in which he expressed "strong uneasiness"
with the affirmance of MacDonald's conviction,29' Judge Murnaghan
authored the opinion in United States v. Brainard2 "2  discussed
above.298 In Brainard, the court held that a judge making an 804(b)(3)
determination should not consider evidence of a declarant's character.
Despite Judge Murnaghan's willingness to defer to the trial judge in
MacDonald, the court reversed the trial judge's corroboration ruling in
Brainard based on corroboration far less compelling than
MacDonald's. 9 4
Finally, the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari despite the
circuit split, constitutional implications, and clear error described
earlier.29 5
Since MacDonald's trial, Helena Stoeckley has confessed her in-
volvement several more times, including both a statement to a reporter
in which she acknowledged that she lied on the witness stand about her
inability to recall her whereabouts during the critical hours because she
feared imprisonment and retaliation from other participants in the
MacDonald murders,298 and a 39 page sworn statement to a private
investigator and a former police officer. 97 In her sworn statement,
267 See MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 12 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
28 See MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Is' MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 10-11 & n.12.
290 MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 6 n.6. In fact, MacDonald had preserved his right to make
several evidentiary challenges, including a direct challenge to the jury's verdict as not based on
evidence which established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even if taken most favorably to the
prosecution. Because MacDonald's conviction had been reversed by the Fourth Circuit on speedy
trial grounds, 632 F.2d 258, those challenges were not before the Supreme Court; they were
preserved. After the Supreme Court's reversal on speedy trial grounds they were litigated before
the Fourth Circuit, see MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224.
29' MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 236 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
292 690 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1982).
293 See supra text accompanying notes 120-22. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, was argued June
9, 1982, and was decided August 16, 1982. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, was argued March 4, 1982
and decided October 7, 1982.
191 See Brainard, 690 F.2d at 1125.
29' See supra text accompanying notes 103-81, 190-203 & 258-73.
29 See Anderson, Cultist Becomes Informant, Dies In Her Hideout, Wash. Post, Feb. 19,
1983, at F21 col. 2.
297 Statement of Helena Davis, formerly known as Helena Stoeckley, to Ted L. Gunderson
and P.E. Beasley (May 24, 1982) (on file with Professor Ralph Spritzer, University of Penn-
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Stoeckley provided additional detail about her involvement in the
crimes and once again asserted MacDonald's innocence. 98 In early
1983, however, Stoeckley mysteriously was found dead in her apart-
ment, after having received several threats from former cult members
regarding her statements.299
We are left, finally, with MacDonald's conviction, which is dis-
turbing in several respects. First and foremost, of course, is that a man
is in prison for a crime that he has repeatedly denied having committed
and that another has repeatedly admitted to having perpetrated with
her associates. He might well be there because a rule of evidence was
interpreted incorrectly and in a way that infringes the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants.
Second, the appellate process failed to overturn an incorrect trial
court decision with very serious consequences. It is difficult to reconcile
the legal position on 804(b)(3) which Judge Murnaghan espoused in
MacDonald with his later opinion in Brainard, a case which was ar-
gued before MacDonald was decided.300
Third, the behavior of the government prosecutors in the Mac-
Donald case is open to question. The case languished in the Justice
Department for years before an indictment was brought. 0 1 Double
jeopardy problems were brushed aside.302 In addition, the government's
actions immediately after the Supreme Court's second speedy trial re-
versal with respect to revocation of MacDonald's bail raise questions of
impropriety s0 serious enough that Judge Murnaghan rebuked govern-
sylvania Law School).
3s Id.
s See Anderson, supra note 296.
t See supra note 294.
301 See MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 13-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
ao United States v. MacDonald, 585 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. MacDonald, No. 79-5253 (4th Cir.,
April 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Bail Revocation Transcript]. MacDonald was released on
ball after the Fourth Circuit's 1980 speedy trial decision pursuant to an August 1980 order issued
by a Fourth Circuit panel, see Bail Revocation Transcript, supra, at 2. Ninety minutes after the
Supreme Court issued its opinion, MacDonald was seized at his house in California and placed
into custody, see Bail Revocation Transcript, supra, at 20. Even though the government had all
necessary papers prepared for bail revocation before the Supreme Court's decision, it made no
attempt to contact MacDonald's attorney to inform him of its intention to arrest MacDonald
immediately in the event of a Supreme Court reversal. Id. More importantly, the government
made no attempt to inform the Fourth Circuit, which had jurisdiction over all bail questions, of its
intention to have MacDonald's bail revoked. Instead, the prosecutors chose to circumvent the
Fourth Circuit entirely by going directly to the district judge who had ruled in their favor
throughout the MacDonald trial and convincing him to order MacDonald's immediate arrest de-
spite the judge's lack of authority to revoke bail. Id. at 21-22. During the hearing to review this
action, Judge Murnaghan of the Fourth Circuit characterized the government's argument that it
acted properly as "one of the most farfetched arguments I've ever heard," and astutely pointed out
to the government that it "ignored the jurisdiction of this court in order to achieve a result,"
actions which Judge Murnaghan told the government "stink[] in my nostrils." Id.
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ment counsel for failing to preserve the "appearance of justice' "G dur-
ing its overzealous effort to have MacDonald incarcerated immediately
after the Supreme Court's decision.
Finally, the Supreme Court in MacDonald denied certiorari de-
spite the clear need for resolution of the 804(b)(3) coiroboration is-
sue30 5 and the incorrect result below.308 Regardless of MacDonald's
guilt or innocence, Stoeckley's statements should have been admitted to
prevent even the appearance of injustice.
'0 Bail Revocation Transcript, supra note 303, at 28.
301 See supra text accompanying notes 103-81.
,o See supra text accompanying notes 257-73.
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